Vulnerability Research CVE-2026-2103 - Infor Syteline ERP Infor Syteline ERP Micheal Reski , Jacob Holvick , and Daniel Mansur Feb 06, 2026 1 Share Keys Included: No Assembly Required Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) Infor Syteline ERP uses hard-coded encryption keys ( CVE-2026-2103 ) embedded in application binaries to protect sensitive credentials stored in its database. An attacker with access to the database can decrypt all stored passwords including application user credentials, database connection strings, API keys, and payment gateway passwords. Because these keys appear toThe application leaks padding validity through errors, status, or timing differences be identical across all installations, a single copy of the software provides universal decryption capability. Organizations running Syteline should assume that any database exposure constitutes full credential compromise and should rotate all credentials stored within the system. No vendor patch is currently available. Background During a recent assessment, we discovered a database that appeared to store encrypted passwords instead of hashing them appropriately. This design is fundamentally flawed, as it allows passwords to be recovered if the encryption mechanism or keys are compromised. The database server was identified as Infor’s Syteline ERP , so the next step was to locate the application interacting with it. We were able to find the application and obtain a copy of it. To our benefit, the application is written in C# which allowed us to quickly reverse the binary back to the original code base. The Discovery Exploring the source code we observed functions and code that validated our suspicion that user passwords being stored in a reversible format using encryption. The use of static, hard-coded keys means that anyone with access to the application binaries can decrypt these protected values. While reviewing .NET assemblies from the application, we encountered a class responsible for managing “protected” secrets. The class stores several encrypted values as static strings: private static readonly string encryptor = “<base64>|<base64>”; private static readonly string sessionEncryptor = “<base64>|<base64>”; private static readonly string ionApiKey = “<base64>|<base64>”; private static readonly string urlSecret = “<base64>|<base64>”; private static readonly string webServiceKey = “<base64>|<base64>”; These secrets were stored in a common format: encrypted_key|encrypted_data , with both halves Base64-encoded. A retrieval method was used to select which key applied to a given operation. This design appears simple at first; however, multiple obfuscation techniques were implemented in an attempt to complicate the decryption process. This is a perfect example of security through obscurity: in the best case, it may frustrate an attacker for a time, but does not contribute any real security. Peeling the Encryption Onion The decryption flow splits the stored value, decodes both parts from Base64, and passes them through an AES decryption routine: public static string GetProtectedData(string name) { // ... select the appropriate encrypted string based on name ... string[] array = empty.Split(new char[1] { ‘|’ }); byte[] encryptedDataKey = Convert.FromBase64String(array[0]); byte[] encrypted = Convert.FromBase64String(array[1]); byte[] key = DecryptDataKey(encryptedDataKey); byte[] bytes = DecryptAes(encrypted, key); return Encoding.UTF8.GetString(bytes); } The DecryptDataKey function decrypts the first portion using a master key. This is a meaningless gesture, since this master key is also available to us, hard-coded into the code. private static byte[] GetKey() { return Convert.FromBase64String(”<redacted>”); } It returns a hard-coded Base64 string, which is used as a 256-bit AES key, embedded directly in the assembly. If a threat actor is able to obtain the binaries, this gives you everything you need to decrypt. We assume is identical across every installation. 1 Instead, an appropriate method for this step would be to utilize Windows DPAPI, a hardware security module, or an external key management service. The primary secret retrieved from this “vault” is used as a password for encrypting logon strings throughout the application. The encryption function reveals a layered approach: public static string EncryptLogonString_AES(string text, ushort maxChars) { string encryptedString = EncryptLogonString(text, maxChars); // Inner layer byte[] data = TextUtil.BufferFromHexString(encryptedString); byte[] inArray = EncryptWithPassword(data, Encryptor); // Outer layer return Convert.ToBase64String(inArray); } Two encryption layers are better than one… Outer Layer: AES with PBKDF2 The outer layer uses AES encryption with a key derived via PBKDF2. Key derivation functions strengthen password-based encryption by stretching low-entropy inputs into larger key spaces. The implementation looks reasonable at first glance. However, notice that the Key and initialization ve...