ESET researchers uncovered a multiplatform supply-chain attack by North Korea-aligned APT group ScarCruft, targeting the Yanbian region in China – home to ethnic Koreans and a crossing point for North Korean refugees and defectors. In the attack, probably ongoing since late 2024, ScarCruft compromised Windows and Android components of a video game platform dedicated to Yanbian-themed games, trojanizing them with a backdoor. The backdoor, named BirdCall by ESET, was originally known to target Windows only; the Android version was discovered as part of this supply-chain attack. In this blogpost, we provide an overview of the attack, and the first public analysis of the Android backdoor. Key points of this blogpost: North Korea-aligned APT group ScarCruft compromised a video game platform used by ethnic Koreans living in the Yanbian region in China. The gaming platform’s Windows client was compromised through a malicious update leading to the RokRAT backdoor, which deployed the more sophisticated BirdCall backdoor. Android games available on the gaming platform were trojanized to contain the Android version of the BirdCall backdoor – a new tool in ScarCruft’s arsenal. The goal of the campaign is espionage, with the backdoor capable of collecting personal data and documents, taking screenshots, and making voice recordings. Scarcruft profile ScarCruft, also known as APT37 or Reaper, has been operating since at least 2012 and is suspected to be a North Korean espionage group . It primarily focuses on South Korea, but other Asian countries have also been targeted. ScarCruft seems to be interested mainly in government and military organizations, and companies in various industries linked to the interests of North Korea. The group also targets North Korean defectors, with the latest such activity presented in this blogpost. BirdCall backdoor Windows version BirdCall is a Windows backdoor written in C++ that we discovered in 2021 and attributed to ScarCruft as part of the ESET Threat Intelligence reporting. The backdoor has a wide range of spying capabilities, including taking screenshots, logging keystrokes and clipboard content, stealing credentials and files, and executing shell commands. For C&C purposes, the backdoor utilizes legitimate cloud storage services, such as Dropbox or pCloud, or compromised websites. BirdCall is usually deployed in a multistage loading chain, starting with a Ruby or Python script, and containing components encrypted using a computer-specific key. The initial version of BirdCall was publicly described by South Korean vendors in 2021 as an advanced version of RokRAT ( S2W , AhnLab ). Android version The Android version of BirdCall, discovered in the attack that we describe in this blogpost, implements a subset of the commands and capabilities of the Windows backdoor – it collects contacts, SMS messages, call logs, documents, media files, and private keys. It can also take screenshots and record surrounding audio. Based on our research, Android BirdCall was actively developed over a span of several months. We identified seven versions, ranging from version 1.0 (created approximately in October 2024) to version 2.0 (created approximately in June 2025). Discovery Our investigation started with a suspicious APK file found on VirusTotal. Upon initial analysis, we determined that the APK is malicious and contains a backdoor. Interestingly, the APK turned out to be a trojanized card game called 延边红十 (machine translation: Yanbian Red Ten), which we traced to its official website, https://www.sqgame[.]net . sqgame is a gaming platform tailored for the people of Yanbian and hosts traditional Yanbian games for Windows, Android, and iOS. The players can compete in card and board games (see Figure 1) with friends or join organized tournaments. Figure 1. Yanbian Red Ten game Surprisingly, the APK available for download on the official website is the same as the APK we initially found on VirusTotal. Moreover, a second Android game (新画图, machine translation: New Drawing) available for download from sqgame was also trojanized with the same backdoor. Further analysis revealed that the backdoor is an Android port of the ScarCruft group’s BirdCall backdoor. The Windows desktop client link on the sqgame website leads to a few-years-old installer that appears to be clean. It does download updates once installed, but we did not identify any malicious code there during our analysis. Investigating further in ESET telemetry, we identified a trojanized mono.dll library, originating from an update package for the desktop client. ESET telemetry shows that this update package had been malicious since at least November 2024, for an unknown period. At the time of writing, this update package was no longer malicious. We also checked the iOS game available on the sqgame website and didn’t find any malicious code. We think that ScarCruft skipped this platform, since the trojanization and delivery of the app would be much more difficult compared to other platforms, possibly running into Apple’s review process. Victimology Since the website compromised in this attack is dedicated to the people of Yanbian and their traditional games, we infer that the primary targets are ethnic Koreans living in Yanbian. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture is a region in China that borders North Korea and is home to the largest ethnic Korean community outside Korea. In this context, we believe that it is probable that the attack was aimed at collecting information on individuals based in (or originating from) the Yanbian region and deemed of interest to the North Korean regime – most likely refugees or defectors. Attack overview Android Two of the Android games available on the sqgame website were found to be trojanized to contain the BirdCall backdoor. The download page available at https://www.sqgame[.]net/games/gamedownload.aspx is shown in Figure 2, with download buttons for the two trojanized games highlighted in red. The third available Android game was clean at the time of our analysis. Figure 2. Download page leading to trojanized games We found evidence that the victims downloaded the trojanized games via a web browser on their devices and probably installed them intentionally. We have not found any other APK locations. We also have not found the malicious APKs on the official Google Play store. We were unable to determine when the website was first compromised and the supply-chain attack started. However, based on our analysis of the deployed malware, we estimate that it happened in late 2024. Table 1 shows the hosting URLs of the two trojanized APK files, along with the hashes of files served at the time of discovery. At the time of writing of this blogpost, the malicious files were still up on the sqgame website. We notified sqgame of the compromise in December 2025, but haven’t received a response. Table 1. Malicious samples Time of discovery URL SHA‑1 Description 2025-10 http://sqgame.com [.]cn/ybht.apk 03E3ECE9F48CF4104AAF C535790CA2FB3C6B26CF Trojanized game with the BirdCall backdoor. 2025-10 http://sqgame.com [.]cn/sqybhs.apk FC0C691DB7E2D2BD3B0B 4C1E24D18DF72168B7D9 Trojanized game with the BirdCall backdoor. Windows While the Windows desktop client available on the sqgame website did not contain malicious code when we analyzed it, we later identified a trojanized mono.dll library, originating from an update package of the desktop client hosted at the URL http://xiazai.sqgame.com[.]cn/dating/20240429.zip . ESET telemetry shows that this update package had been malicious since at least November 2024, for an unknown period – but at the time of writing, this update package was no longer malicious. ScarCruft took a clean mono library and patched it with extra code and data, containing a downloader. The downloader first checks running processes for analysis tools and virtual machine environments and does not proceed if any are found. Otherwise, it looks for the process of the sqgame client and constructs a path to the mono library in its installation folder. Next, it downloads and executes shellcode, which contained the RokRAT backdoor at the time of discovery. Finally, the downloader terminates the client process and downloads the original clean version of the mono library, replacing the trojanized one in the installed client folder. Both the payload and clean mono library are downloaded from legitimate South Korean websites that were compromised for this purpose – a typical TTP of ScarCruft. According to our telemetry, the RokRAT backdoor was subsequently used to download and install the BirdCall backdoor on the victimized machines. Android BirdCall analysis In this section, we provide a technical analysis of the Android BirdCall backdoor – an Android port of the eponymous Windows backdoor written in C++. Internally, the backdoor is named zhuagou , which can be translated (from Chinese) as “catching dogs”. Trojanized Android games Android BirdCall is distributed via trojanized Android games. In the attack described in this blogpost, we believe that ScarCruft did not gain access to the game’s source code, only to the sqgame website or web server, and instead took the original game APKs and recompiled or repackaged them with malicious code added. In the trojanized APKs, the AndroidManifest.xml entry point activity is modified and points to the added malicious code – which, after starting the backdoor, executes the original entry activity of the game. In the analyzed samples, the modified entry point activity was either com.example.zhuagou.SplashScreen or com.mob.util.MobSs (in the latest sample). The modifications to AndroidManifest.xml also include new activity and service definitions for the backdoor, as well as additional permissions required for its operation. A comparison of packages in the original game and its trojanized version is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3. Package tree of the legitimate game (left) and its trojanized